An essay on the nature of pain : with some considerations on its principal varieties as connected with disease, and remarks on the treatment : being the subject of an inaugural dissertation delivered at the University of Edinburgh, now translated, with additions / by William Griffin.

  • Griffin, William, 1794-1848.
Date:
1826
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: An essay on the nature of pain : with some considerations on its principal varieties as connected with disease, and remarks on the treatment : being the subject of an inaugural dissertation delivered at the University of Edinburgh, now translated, with additions / by William Griffin. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England.

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    The Stoical philosophy, akhoiigli it left us some magnanimous instances of human fortitude and resolution, and had (in its pretensions to rid mankind of every thing like misery) something of allurement, was so totally opposed to the very instincts of our nature, as to be altogether un_ fitted to lead to correct views on the subject. It was only in later times, when the beneficent de- signs of Providence in all her works became more strikingly obvious, and when the origin of evil came to be a matter of marvel and of dis- cussion among philosophers, that pain and dis- ease were considered as possibly conducive to some ultimately useful end. Unfortunately, however, the two, by a kind of association of the symptom with the cause, were almost invariably confounded—the terms were used almost syno- nimously; and hence, as in very many instances, it was difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the occurrence of disease with any conservative de- sign, the same inference was held with respect to pain. But whatever opinion may be held in regard to the former, there is perhaps no position so li- terally or so generally true as the exploded and half-forgotten one, that pain is no evil,—since nothing can be truly considered so, that under existing relations contributes and is necessary to our welfare. Abstractedly considered, there' seems no absolute necessity for its existence any