Principles of physiological psychology / translated from the Fifth edition by E.B. Tichener.

  • Wundt, Wilhelm Max, 1832-1920.
Date:
1904
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: Principles of physiological psychology / translated from the Fifth edition by E.B. Tichener. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The University of Leeds Library. The original may be consulted at The University of Leeds Library.

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    19-20] Part I The Bodily Substrate of the Mental Life CHAPTER I The Organic Evolution of Mental Function § i. The Criteria of Mind and the Range of the Mental Life The mental functions form a part of the phenomena of life. Wherever we ■ observe them, the}- are accompanied by the processes of nutrition and ■ reproduction. On the other hand, the general phenomena of life may be manifested in cases where we have no reason for supposing the presence ■ of a mind. Hence the first question that arises, in an inquiry concerning the bodily substrate of mentality, is this : What are the characteristics that justify our attributing mental functions to a living body, an object in the domain of animate nature ? Here, upon the very threshold of physiological psychology, we are con- fronted with unusual difficulties. The distinguishing characteristics of mind are of a subjective sort; we know them only from the contents of our own consciousness. But the question calls for objective criteria, from which we shall be able to argue to the presence of a consciousness. Now the only possible criteria of the kind consist in certain bodily movements, which carry with them an indication of their origin in psychical processes. But when are we justified in referring the movements of a living creature to conscious conditions ? How uncertain the answer to this question is, especially when metaphysical prejudice has a part to play in it, may be seen at once by an appeal to history. Hylozoism inclines to regard every movement, even the fall of a stone, as a mental action ; Cartesian spiritual- ism recognises no expression of mental life beyond the voluntary movements of man. These are extreme views. The first is beyond all verification ; the second is correct only upon the one point that the manifestations of our own conscious life must always furnish the standard of reference in our judgments of similar indications in other creatures. Hence we must not begin our search for mental function among the lower types of organised nature, where its modes of expression are least perfect. It is only by working our way downwards, from man to the animals, that we shall find the point at which mental life begins. n