Problems of science and philosophy : the papers read at the joint session of the Aristotelian Society, the British Psychological Society, and the Mind Association, held at Bedford college, London, July 11th-14th, 1919.

Date:
1919
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Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Problems of science and philosophy : the papers read at the joint session of the Aristotelian Society, the British Psychological Society, and the Mind Association, held at Bedford college, London, July 11th-14th, 1919. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    Dawes Hicks seems to think that many people have meant by it this relation, and that they have confused this with “the sort of relation which a subject may have to an object.” I very much doubt whether anyone has been in the deplorably confused state which this mistake would involve. Such a person would have to identify the two statements “I am acquainted with «” and “« is a state of my mind.” Now of course I do not wish to deny that I may be acquainted with my states of mind, e.g., through introspection. But, if so, I am acquainted with them because and in so far as I introspect, not because they are my states. Again, many people hold that sensation is, or involves, acquaintance with sense-data. And some people, ¢.g., Professor Stout, seem to hold that sense-data are states of mind of the nature of feelings. If both these opinions were true I should be acquainted with what is in fact a state of my mind whenever I had a sensation. But this would not be because the sense- datum is a state of my mind, but because it is the object of a sensation. Moreover, everyone who talks of acquaintance regards 1t as a cognitive state; whilst the relation between me and my states of mind is perfectly neutral as between cognition, conation, and feeling. (Gi) Mr. Russell has described acquaintance as “a direct cognitive relation” between a mind and an object. The question as to whether and in what sense it is cognitive belongs to a later section; but it will be in place here to point out some of the ambiguities of direct and to explain in what sense J do not hold that acquaintance need be direct. The contrast between direct and indirect may refer either (a) to the nature of a relation or (4) to distinctions between various kinds of judgment. The latter senses do not concern us at present, since they refer to knowledge by acquaintance primarily, and only to acquaintance itself if this prove to be knowledge. A relation may be said to be direct if the proposition #Ry